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Abstract
Probabilistic  reasoning  biases  have  been  widely  associated  with
individuals experiencing delusional beliefs (Galbraith, Manktelow &
Morris,  2011;  Lincoln,  Ziegler,  Mehl,  &  Rief,  2010;  Speechley,
Whitman,  & Woodward,  2009;  White  & Mansell,  2009),  however,
little research  has  focused  on  biases  occuring  during  every  day
reasoning (Galbraith, Manktelow & Morris, 2011), and moral based
reasoning (Wilkinson, Jones & Caulfield, 2011). 235 participants were
recruited  across  four  experiments  exploring  crime  based  reasoning
through  different  modalities  and  dual  processing  tasks.  Study  one
explored  delusional  ideation  when  completing  a  visually  presented
crime based reasoning task.  Study two explored the same task in an
auditory  presentation.  Study three  utilised  a  dual  task  paradigm to
explore modality and executive functioning. Study four extended this
paradigm to the auditory modality. The results indicated that modality
and  delusional  ideation  had  a  significant  effect  on  individuals
reasoning  about  violent  and  non-violent  crime  (p<0.05).   Dual
processing did not impact upon reasoning. 
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Individuals, unavoidably, engage in the process of reasoning as they interact 
and exist within the world (Green & Gilhooly, 2005).   Simple, everyday tasks, such 
as deciding over a coffee menu, entail a reasoning process.  Whilst individuals have 
the ability to successfully navigate their way through everyday complex situations, all
kinds of ‘biases’ or errors in reasoning have been detected whilst individuals solve 
simple reasoning problems in a psychological laboratory setting (Verschueren, 
Schaeken, & Ydewalle, 2005).  
Probabilistic processing properties have been found to impact upon the way 
that individual’s reason (Evans, Ellis, & Newstead, 1996; George, 1997; Stevenson & 
Over, 1995), playing a central role in the conditional inference process (Liu, Lo, & 
Wu, 1996; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000).  Lui et al., (1996) demonstrated how 
probability estimates were used to solve conditional inference problems, which 
Oaksford et al., (2000) likens to a computational model. They claim that the tendency 
to accept the inference is directly related to the conditional probability of the 
conclusion given the categorical premise. 
A probabilistic reasoning bias has been widely reported in clinical populations
(Hemsley & Garety, 1986; Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988; Garety, Hemsley, & 
Wessely,1991) which suggests that under conditions of uncertainty, patients with 
delusions demonstrate a `jumping to conclusions' (JTC) style of reasoning, requiring 
less information than ‘healthy’ individuals to arrive at a decision, and being more 
confident about the decision that they have reached.  Huq et al. (1988) presented 
deluded type schizophrenia patients and a control group with a pair of containers.  
One of the containers contained 85 red and 15 green beads and the other contained 15 
red and 85 green beads.  Once out of view, the beads were drawn one at a time in a 
seemingly random sequence.  Participants were required to indicate when they had 
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reached a decision as to which jar the beads were being drawn from. Deluded patients 
required less draws than controls before reaching a decision and approximately 40% 
of the deluded patients came to a confident conclusion after only one draw.  This has 
subsequently been replicated in several further studies (Dudley John, Young, & Over, 
1997a, 1997b; Fear & Healy, 1997; Garety et al., 1991, in press; Peters & Garety, in 
press).  Similar findings have been identified with non-clinical populations that have 
been screened for subclinical delusional ideation using the Peters Delusion Inventory 
(e.g. Galbraith, Manktelow & Morris, 2010; 2008). 
Dual processing theory
Dual process theories have provided an alternative explanation to previous 
single system theories which maintain that cognitive processes such as reasoning are 
therefore governed by a single system (Braine, 1990; Rips, 1994; Johnson-Laird, 
1983).  Dual process theories, therefore, arguably stand in contrast to modular models 
of human cognition (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Carruthers, 2006; Sperber, 1994; 
Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).  Dual processing accounts of reasoning and human 
behaviour have been developed by both cognitive and social psychologists 
(Manktelow, 2012), the relevance of which is the theoretical application to ‘higher’ 
cognitive processes which include thinking, reasoning, decision making, and social 
judgment (Evans, 2008).  All dual process theories share the common idea that there 
are two differing modes of processing: System One and System Two (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Stanovich, 1999).  The first system, occasionally referred to as the 
heuristic system (De Neys, 2006), solves problems based on an individual’s prior 
knowledge and beliefs.  The second system, sometimes referred to as the analytic 
system, allows reasoning according to logical standards, which requires access to a 
central working memory system of limited capacity.  As a result, System One is 
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assumed to operate rapidly and automatically, whereas the operations of the analytic 
system are believed to be slow and heavily demanding of resources (De Neys, 2006).  
These two systems can act in concert and consequently the heuristic system will 
usually provide a fast, frugal and correct conclusion.  However, heuristic processing 
can lead to biased reasoning in situations that require more elaborate and analytic 
processing.  This occurrence leads to conflict between the two systems (Stanovich & 
West, 2000).    
Evans (1984) suggests that heuristic processes are preconscious, and their role 
is to select representation relevant to a particular problem space.  This is in contrast to
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) proposal of strategy heuristics that provide shortcuts
to a solution.  Analytic processing is conscious and therefore, can be classified as 
deliberate, explicit thinking.  This function serves to operate on representations 
considered to be relevant by heuristic processes that are then used to generate 
inferences and form judgments (Evans, 1995; 1996).
System One, according to Evans (1996), is pragmatic in nature, is based on 
prior experiences, beliefs, and background knowledge.  It accomplishes objectives 
reliably and efficiently without necessarily accompanying consciousness.  System 
Two is explicit, sequential, controllable, and makes high demands of working 
memory (Evans, 1996).  Typically, System Two operates outside of normative logical
conventions, however, it has the ability of accomplishing solutions to logical, 
hypothetical, forecasting and consequential problems (Evans, 1996).  In comparison 
to System One, System Two is slow, however, its speed facilitates flexibility and 
controllability.
Modality
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Little research has explored the impact that modality (auditory vs. visual) may 
have on reasoning biases, particularly when considering delusion ideation and 
especially given the characteristics, such as deficits in auditory sensory “echoic” 
memory (Umbritch et al., 2000) associated with ‘schziotype’ experiences.  These 
deficits lead to difficulties in extracting relevant information from sensory stimuli 
across all modalities (Javitt et al., 2000).  
As such, individuals who experience deficits in extracting relevant information
may produce biases on tasks that require the utilisation of represented extracted 
information.  In other words, some individuals are overwhelmed with the mass of 
information available through their senses, and are unable to filter out the relevant or 
important information.  
As noted by Delhommeau, Dubal, Collet, and Jouvent (2003) few studies have
explored the perceptual, and in particular auditory, processing of individuals with 
Schizotypal tendencies.  Yee, Deldin, and Miller (1992) used an Event-Related 
potentials augmenting/reducing paradigm to rule out simple sensory deficits in tone 
perception; they found no differences between groups.  However, some studies have 
reported differences in the strategies employed by controls and test groups (Miller, 
1986), which suggests that differences may have occurred due to peripheral auditory 
abnormalities or difficulties in maintaining a template in echoic memory.  
Delusional Ideation
The continuity approach has gathered a wealth of support with regards to 
considering delusions and other features of psychosis being measurable on a 
continuum that includes clinical to the nonclinical population (Freeman, Pugh, 
Vorontsova, Antley & Slater, 2010; Galbraith, Morgan, Jones, Ormerod Galbraith & 
Manktelow, 2014; van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul & Krabbendam, 
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2009).  Schizotypy is a sub-clinical category of experience which captures individuals
who present schizo-psychopathological characteristics but are not extreme enough to 
be classed as clinical (Claridge & Beech, 1995).  Gruzelier (1996) suggests that 
schizotypy consists mainly of impulsive non-conformity, social anxiety, positive 
features such as unusual perceptions, and negative features such as introversion.  
Galbraith, Manktelow & Morris (2008; 2010) have conducted a number of 
studies exploring psychopathological tendency primarily composed of samples of 
non-pathological individuals.  Galbraith et al.’s approach, using a psychometric test to
screen for schizotypal tendencies, circumvent issues of medication effects, 
motivation, and the nature and severity of the symptoms and experiences over time 
faced when testing a clinical sample (Galbraith, Manktelow & Morris, 2010; Thurston
et al. 2008).  Furthermore, ethical dilemmas are overcome, as are the implications 
faced when recruiting and testing a clinical sample (Galbraith, Manktelow & Morris, 
2010).  
The presented research, therefore, is an attempt to assess whether delusional 
belief rating relates to probabilistic reasoning biases on auditory and visually 
presented crime based reasoning task.  The research aimed to explore whether 
individuals with high scores on the Peters Delusion Inventory (PDI) reason differently
to a control group (individuals scoring low for schizotypal tendencies) on auditory 
and visually presented crime based reasoning tasks.  It was hypothesised that high 
scoring individuals would make decisions based on less information.
EXPERIMENT ONE
Method
Participants.  Forty-five (11 male and 34 female) student volunteers from various 
undergraduate courses at a University took part in this study.  The age of the 
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participants ranged between 19 and 44 (M = 24.33, SD = 6.82). No other 
demographic information was collected. 
Design.  This study adopted a mixed 2x2 experimental design.  The study consisted of
a within participant factor, violent (emotionally arousing) and non-violent scenarios, 
and a between participant factor, high and low scorers on the PDI.  The dependent 
variable was data gathering (which was a measure based on a scale to rate how much 
information an individual required before making a decision). 
 Materials & Procedure.  The following measures were presented to participants in a 
laboratory setting.  The Peters Delusions Inventory (Peters et al., 1999) – paper form- 
is a 21-item measure of delusional ideation.   The scale has good levels of reliability 
and validity (Peters et al., 2004).  The response format is a 5 point scale for distress, 
preoccupation, and conviction in relation to the 21-items presented.  The       
Computerised Visual Reasoning Task (CVRT) was specially designed to measure 
individuals crime based decision-making about whether the character in two scenarios
‘had done the right thing’.  Participants were able to gather as much or as little 
information as they desired about a given scenario before making a decision.  This 
concept derived from traditional reasoning tasks, such as the beads tasks, except 
applied to a manufactured but realistic life scenarios.     
The violent scenario (emotionally arousing) used a story about a character that 
attacked a ‘youth’ in the street.  The attack was based on a number of assumptions.  
Following the short story about the sequence of events leading to the attack were 
subsequent statements that provided additional information and described a more 
complete picture of the events. Each additional statement was displayed on screen for 
as long as the participant wished to view.  The non-violent scenario was based on a 
story about a character that lied in order to borrow money from a man with no 
intention to pay him back.  The statements following the short story described vital 
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information with regards to exposing the truth behind the character’s need for the 
money.  Participants were required to indicate at which point they were happy to 
make a decision by pressing the D key and the number of required statements 
recorded.       
 Results
Descriptive Statistics.  The reasoning task results were analysed using SPSS statistics 
17.0 and are presented below.  Descriptive statistics for the ‘data gathering’ scores 
can be viewed in Table 1.0 (see appendix). The descriptive statistics suggested that 
high PDI scorers require less information compared to low PDI scorers for both 
violent and non violent crime scenarios, although this effect is represented to a greater
extent in the non violent crime scenario.  
Inferential Statistics.  A two-way mixed ANOVA suggested that there was not a 
significant interaction between PDI and Crime Type (F1,41 = 3.15, p > 0.05).  Further
analysis showed a low effect size (D = 0.18) according to Cohen’s D (Cohen, 1992).
    
Non-violent Scenario and ‘data gathering’ 
Whilst a non-significant interaction was found overall, a significant effect was 
highlighted when analysing PDI on ‘data gathering’ with regards to reasoning about 
non-violent scenarios (F1, 41 = 6.96, p < 0.05).  Further analysis revealed a large 
effect size (D= 1.02) according to Cohen’s D (Cohen, 1992).   
Discussion
The data collected from the reasoning task suggest that there were no significant 
differences between high and low PDI scorers, when measuring the amount of 
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information required before making a decision about a violent crime scenario.   
However, there was a significant difference when reasoning about a non-violent 
scenario.  Despite the non significant results from the violent scenario, it is still 
possible to see a trend in the mean ‘data gathering’ scores that suggests that high 
scorers requested less information when reasoning about a violent crime.  It seems 
that low scoring individuals required more information, when compared to high 
scoring individuals, before making a decision or coming to a conclusion.  
EXPERIMENT TWO
Method
Participants.  Fifty-five participants from a University took part in this study.  All 
participants were undergraduate students from a range of faculties and degree courses 
across the University.  Participants were aged between 19 and 52 (M = 23.8, SD 
8.01), ten were males and forty-five females.  It was ensured during the recruitment 
stage that all participants were first language native English speakers. 
Design.  A 2x2 experimental design was adopted for this study.  Similar to study one, 
independent variable one was based on PDI scores and independent variables two was
based on scenario type (violence and non-violent).  
Materials & Procedure.  Consistent with study one, the 21-item Peters Delusions 
Inventory (Peters et al., 1999) was used to measure delusional ideation (see study one 
for more information).  The Computerised Auditory Reasoning Task (CART) was 
specially designed for this study, which was an adaptation from study one.  The 
auditory reasoning task presented the same information as study one but through an 
auditory modality, given the evidence of cross modality bias occurring in individuals 
with schizotypy as well as a small amount of evidence for differentiation in psychosis 
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prone individuals (Rheed, Wakefield, Harris, Parry, Cella, Tsakanikos, 2007:  Ferstl, 
Hanewinkel & Krag, 1994).  Once again, Eprime programming software was used to 
program, present and capture participant’s responses. Participants wore a head set in 
order to listen to the crime based scenarios and additional information.  Given that the
information was delivered to participants through auditory presentation, statements 
could be heard once unlike study one where participants could read and re-read on 
screen. 
Results
Descriptive statistics The reasoning task results were analysed using SPSS statistical 
analysis software 17.0, and are presented below.  Descriptive statistics for the ‘data 
gathering’ scores can be viewed in table 1.1 see appendix.
Inferential statistics The results from the Levene’s pre-test were non significant and 
therefore did not violate any assumptions for parametric testing (Levene’s p > 0.05).   
A two-way mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed on the results of 
the reasoning task, therefore considering the independent variables of PDI (high and 
low) and crime type (violent and non-violent), and the dependent variable data 
gathering.  The two-way mixed ANOVA revealed a non-significant interaction 
between PDI and scenario type (F2, 32 = 15.04, p > 0.05).  Further analysis showed a 
large effect size according to Cohen’s D (d = 1.3), and retrospective power = 0.99 
(Cohen, 1992).  
Discussion
The results from this study proved interesting.  A two-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) demonstrated that overall there was no interaction between PDI and crime 
type, however, the p and f values suggested significant differences between high and 
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low scorers within each crime type (violent and non violent).  Either individuals who 
scored high for Schizotypal tendencies required fewer ‘chunks’ of information before 
making a decision (data gathering), compared to individuals who scored low for 
Schizotypal tendencies, or it is possible that low scorers gathered more information in 
comparison to high scorers.   The descriptive statistics suggest that the violent crime 
scenario, which was potentially more emotionally arousing, created a bigger gap 
between the mean ‘data gathering’ scores generated by the high and low scoring 
groups. Therefore, it could be argued that the violent crime scenario exacerbated the 
‘jump to conclusions’ bias that frequently occurs in individuals at risk of delusions 
(Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988), or caused low scorers to gather further information 
before making a decision. Furthermore, the results suggest that the biases in reasoning
that accompany delusional beliefs, which have presented themselves on traditional 
non-specific reasoning tasks, also present themselves on crime based reasoning tasks. 
  EXPERIMENT THREE
Method
Participants. 74 participants from a University took part in this study.  The 
participants were undergraduate students from a range of Faculties and degree courses
across the University.  Participants were aged between 18 and 54 (M = 22.5, SD 
6.69), 23 were males and 51 females.  It was ensured during the recruitment stage that
all participants were first language native English speakers.  
Design. The 2x2x2 experiment designed enabled the exploration of three independent 
variables: PDI (between factor determined by the scores on the Peters Delusions 
Inventory: Peters et al., 1996); scenario type (within factor representing non-violent 
and violent); and memory task (within factor compiled of high and low memory load) 
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explored using a dot matrix memory task.  There was one dependent variable which 
was the amount of information required before making a decision based on a 0-8 scale
(data gathering).      
Materials & Procedure.  Consistent with previous studies presented in this paper the 
21-item Peters Delusions Inventory (Peters et al., 1999) was used to measure 
delusional belief ideation (see previous studies for more information).  The Dual 
Processing Visual Computerised Decision Task (DPVCDT) was specially developed 
for this study.  This task was an adaptation of the reasoning task used in experiment 
one to present information to participants in a visual modality.  Statements were 
present on screen for participants to observe for as long as they wished.  In addition to
previous studies in this paper, the dot matrix memory task (dual task) was completed. 
Both of these tasks were presented and completed using E-Prime stimulus software.  
This design explores whether ‘dual tasking’ as opposed to a change in modality, and 
therefore greater demands on processing, enhances the effects of biases in individuals 
who score high for delusional beliefs.  This is supported by the evidence of bias’ 
occurring in individuals with Schizophrenia, schizo-type disorders, as well as a small 
amount of evidence for differentiation in psychosis prone individuals (Rheed, 
Wakefield, Harris, Parry, Cella, Tsakanikos, 2007:  Ferstl, Hanewinkel & Krag, 
1994).  
Results
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Descriptive statistics The reasoning task results were analysed using SPSS statistics 
analysis software 17.0, and are presented below.  Descriptive statistics for the ‘data 
gathering’ scores can be viewed in table 1.2 see appendix.
Inferential statistics: ‘Data gathering’ The data gathering results were analysed using 
a 3 way mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to assess the impact of one between 
subject independent variables (PDI: high and low) and two within subject independent
variables (Scenario type: violent and non-violent; Memory load: high and low) on 
participants ‘data gathering’ scores.   
Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices was significant (p < 0.05) and therefore 
the results below are reported using the Greenhouse-Geisser.  
There was no significant interaction between memory and PDI (F= 2.69, p > 0.05, 2 
= 0.05), PDI and Scenario type (F= 0.12, p > 0.05, 2 = 0.00), memory and scenario 
(F= 1.18, p > 0.05, 2 = 0.02), and memory, scenario and PDI (F= 0.00, p > 0.05, 2 
= 0.00).  
There was a significant difference in mean data gathering between high and low 
scorers (F= 6.79,  p < 0.05).  There was also a significant main effect of memory 
(easy / hard: p < 0.05) but there was no significant main effect of scenario type (p > 
0.05). 
Discussion
The quantitative data presented no significant interactions, in any combination, 
between PDI, memory load and crime type.  This could be interpreted, explained and 
accounted for in a number of ways.  It is possible that the experiment design is not 
sensitive enough to capture any relationships between PDI, dual systems of 
processing and crime scenario type, despite adopting tools and methods  that had been
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used previously in a number of studies which had generated significant results 
(Galbraith et al., 2009; Evans, 2009; De Neys, 2006). 
   
The results suggest that the biases that occurred in experiment one and two were not a
result of overloaded resources and increased demands placed on memory but rather 
the impact of modality (visually or auditory processed information). Nonetheless, it is 
impossible to be conclusive without testing the dual process paradigm within the 
auditory modality. 
It is also possible that dual process theory does not adequately account for aspects of 
crime based real world reasoning and hence there is no relationship or interaction 
between the two separate systems when reasoning about crime based scenarios.  It is 
also possible that the two systems of processing do not impact upon one another when
individuals are engaged with crime based reasoning.       
EXPERIMENT FOUR
Method
Participants.  Sixty-One participants took part in the auditory Dual Processing study. 
The participants were recruited from a University.  The sample consisted of 
undergraduate students from a range of faculties and degree courses across the 
University.  Participants were aged between 18 and 38 (M = 22.8, SD 5.41), 21 were 
males and 40 females.
Design. A 2x2x2 experimental design was adopted for this study.  Independent 
variables PDI (high and low), crime type (Violent and non-violent) and memory task 
(High and Low).  The dependent variable was data gathering (the amount of 
information participants required to make a decision).
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Materials & Procedure 
The study comprised three main component measures.  As with the previous studies 
in this paper, the 21-item Peters Delusions Inventory (Peters et al., 1999) was used to 
measure delusional belief ideation (see study one for more information).  The Dual 
Processing Auditory Computerised Decision Task (DPACDT)was developed specially
for this study.  The task was based on the visual crime based reasoning task in 
experiment three, however, the renovated design presented the scenarios and 
statements to participants in an auditory modality accompanied by a visual dot matrix 
memory task.  The tasks were presented and results were recorded using E-Prime 
stimulus software.  This design explores whether reasoning biases are further 
enhanced by ‘dual tasking’ or whether the modality of presented information impacts 
upon individuals decisions (Rheed, Wakefield, Harris, Parry, Cella, Tsakanikos, 2007;
Ferstl, Hanewinkel & Krag, 1994).  
Participants were presented with either a simple or difficult dot matrix memory test 
which they were required to remember whilst reading a crime based scenario 
accompanied by additional statements.  Participants were required to indicate at which
point they were happy to make a decision about whether the character in the story had
done the right thing.    Participant’s responses were recorded on a ten-part scale.  
Once participants had completed the crime scenario, they were then requested to 
recall the dot matrix memory task.  This process was repeated to account for violent 
and non violent as well as simple and difficult conditions.    
Results
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Descriptive statistics The reasoning task results were analysed using SPSS statistics 
analysis software 17.0, and are presented below.  Descriptive statistics for the ‘data 
gathering’ scores can be viewed in table 1.3 see appendix.
Inferential statistics: ‘Data gathering’ The data gathering results were analysed using 
a 2x2x2 mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to assess the impact of one between 
subject independent variables (PDI: high and low) and two within subject independent
variables (Scenario type: violent and non-violent; Memory load: high and low) on 
participants ‘data gathering’ scores.   
Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices was significant (p < 0.05) and therefore 
the results below are reported using the Greenhouse-Geisser.  
There was no significant interaction between memory and PDI (F= 0.48, p > 0.05, 2 
= 0.01), PDI and Scenario type (F= 0.95, p > 0.05, 2 = 0.02), memory and scenario 
(F= 0.57 p= 0.81 2 = 0.00), and memory, scenario and PDI (F= 0.04, p > 0.05, 2 = 
0.00).  
There was a significant difference in mean data gathering when comparing high and 
low PDI scorers (F = 70.7, p < 0.05). 
Discussion
As with experiment three, the analysis of the data gathering results found no 
significant relationships between PDI, dual processing and crime type, suggesting that
these factors do not impact upon one another. However, there were significant 
differences highlighted between high and low PDI scorers with regards to their data 
gathering scores consistent with previous findings.  In other words, high PDI scorers 
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required fewer pieces of information before coming to a conclusion in comparison to 
low scorers who require more pieces of information before making a decision.  
However, the memory tasks did not interfere with this finding and caused no further 
elevated signs of reasoning biases.  This suggests that the dual processing (Evans, 
2003) account does not provide an explanation for why biases are elevated when 
presented in a visual modality.   
It is possible that high PDI scorers require fewer pieces of information due to 
problems or abnormalities experienced with the processes and processing that are 
involved in the extraction of relevant information from sensory stimuli across all 
modalities (Javitt et al., 2000), however, the frequency or intensity of these 
abnormalities are heightened when information is presented orally.    
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Experiment one and two produced particularly interesting findings with 
regards to both reasoning biases and influential factors surrounding the intensity of 
those biases.  It was concluded from experiment two that delusional ideation and 
crime based reasoning related to either modality, visual or orally presented 
information (Delhommeau, Dubal, Collet, and Jouvent , 2003), or the increase load on
memory resources which naturally occur when remembering information that has 
been received through the auditory senses.  However, the methodological design 
adopted for this study made it impossible to identify whether the causal factor was 
modality or indeed competition for working memory resources.  Therefore, 
experiment three and four provided a solution to address this problem by adopting a 
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dual task design (Evans, 2003; 2008).  This allowed for an investigation of whether an
increase in memory load enhances the crime based reasoning biases identified by 
experiment one and two.  The outcome of these additional studies suggest that it is not
increased load on memory and resources that enhances the biases and therefore it can 
be deduced that there are key differences when reasoning using verbally presented 
information compared to visually presented information.  The results reported in 
experiment two demonstrated that individuals with Schizotypal tendencies required 
fewer ‘pieces’ of information before making a decision, compared to individuals who 
scored low for Schizotypal tendencies.  There was a significant difference in both 
non-violent and violent crime scenarios with regards to individual’s ‘data gathering’ 
scores.  However, the violent crime scenario created a bigger gap between the mean 
‘data gathering’ scores generated by the high and low scoring groups. Therefore, it 
could be suggested that the violent crime scenario enhances and therefore replicates 
the ‘jump to conclusions’ bias that frequently occurs in individuals at risk of delusions
(Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988).  Furthermore, the results suggested that the biases in
reasoning that accompany delusional ideation, have presented themselves on 
traditional non-specific reasoning tasks, also present themselves on crime based 
reasoning tasks given the right conditions.  
This study has provided an initial exploration of delusional ideation and crime 
based moral reasoning, which is a novel focus.  There could be merit in exploring 
delusional ideation and moral reasoning in a more direct measurable way using tools 
such as those outlined by Palmer (2012).  A relationship between delusional ideation 
and moral reasoning could have implications for theoretical approach.    
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Table 1.0
Data gathering descriptive statistics.
Crime 
Type
PDI 
Group
Mean ‘Data 
Gathering’  
(chunks of 
information)
‘Data 
Gathering’  
Standard 
Deviation (SD) P F
Violent High 
(n=15)
2.14 2.25 0.69 0.16
Low 
(n=15)
2.57 2.53
Non 
violent
High 
(n=15)
1.79 1.42 0.04 6.96
Low 
(n=15)
3.71 2.34
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Table 1.1
Data gathering descriptive statistics.
Crime 
Type
PDI 
Group
Mean Data Gathering 
(chunks of information) 
Data Gathering 
Standard Deviation 
(SD) p f
Violent High 
(n=19)
2.22 3.04 0.02 23.18
Low 
(n=19)
6.78 3.95
Non 
violent
High 
(n=19
3.11 3.27 0.01 8.82
Low 
(n=19)
6.06 2.65
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Table 1.2
‘Data gathering’ descriptive statistics
Crime Type PDI Group
Mean 
data 
gathering
Data gathering 
standard deviation 
(DV) p f
Violent (hard)
High (n = 
25) 3.04 3.05
0.00 11.84
 Low (n=25) 4.72 4.03
Violent (easy) High (n=25) 2.68 2.69 0.00 18.31
 Low (n=25) 5.2 3.99
Non Violent 
(hard) High (n=25) 2.88 2.83
0.12 2.52
 Low (n=25) 4.32 3.53
Non Violent 
(easy) High (n=25) 3.48 3.16
0.09 2.99
 Low (n=25) 5.68 3.65
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Table 1.3
 Data gathering descriptive statistics
Crime Type
PDI 
Group
Mean data 
gathering 
Data gathering 
standard deviation 
(DV) p f
Violent (hard)
Low 
(n=20) 6.50 3.08
0.00 10.37
 
High 
(n=20) 2.08 1.99
Violent (easy)
Low 
(n=20) 6.88 3.17
0.00 11.39
 
High 
(n=20) 2.33 1.69
Non Violent 
(hard)
Low 
(n=20) 6.21 2.96
0.48 0.52
 
High 
(n=20) 2.55 2.46
Non Violent 
(easy)
Low 
(n=20) 6.54 3.27
0.00 14.87
 
High 
(n=20) 2.41 1.77
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